Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an award can first be challenged under Section 34 before the court, and the order on that challenge can then be appealed under Section 37. A recurring question has been whether the appeal court can take a fresh or broader look at the award than the Section 34 court could.
In Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust (2026 INSC 34, decided 7 January 2026), the Supreme Court answered no. It held that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 is akin to its jurisdiction under Section 34, and that the scope of interference in a Section 37 appeal cannot go beyond the grounds on which the award itself could be challenged under Section 34.
Why it matters: an appeal under Section 37 is not a second full review of the merits. If a ground was not available to set aside the award under Section 34 — for example, a disagreement with the tribunal's reading of evidence — it does not become available simply because the matter has moved up a level.
The practical takeaway for parties who lose in arbitration: the realistic window to challenge an award is the narrow Section 34 window, and it does not widen on appeal. That makes the quality of the arbitration itself — the record, the evidence, the arguments put before the tribunal — the part of the process that actually decides the outcome.
This note summarises the reported judgment for general information and is not legal advice on any specific matter.